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\newcommand{\titulo}{Function: embodied, embedded and autonomous}
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autonomous}
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\texttt{\emailautor} \\
\texttt{\urlautor} \\ \\
%\texttt{xabier@sindominio.net} \\
%\texttt{http://sindominio.net/\symbol{126}xabier}\\
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% UPV INGLES
%  PhD student on ``Philosophy, Science, Technology and Society'',\\
%  Departament of Logic and Philosophy of Science, \\
%  EHU-UPV University of the Basque Country, \\
%  Post Box 1249/20080 Donostia/San-Sebastian, Spain \\
% -------------------------------
% UPV CASTELLANO
%  Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, \\
%  EHU-UPV (Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Universidad del País
%  Vasco), \\
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   v.1.0. & 18-04-02 & Essay for the ``History and Philosophy of
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Evolutionary and Adaptive Systems MSc at COGS, University of Sussex,
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\section{Introduction}
  According to a hermeneutic gadamerian attitude there is one single
 way
  to be objective and that is to make our prejudices, intentions and
  interests as explicit as possible in a cognitive quest
  (as every coursework and essay ought to be), and test them against
 the
  alterity of the text:
  be it the Bible, the episodes of life, the chapters of political
 history
   or the book of nature to whose pages
  we (as philosophers of adaptive systems), in this course, belong.
  We shall, thus,
  specify that it is not our concern in this essay to work upon
  a general theory of function, autonomy and adaption (which will
  go beyond the reasonable aims of an inmature coursework) but
  to detect and work (as a artisan would do) upon some problematic
  (and other hopeful) conceptual issues regarding the theoretica
  framework of the scientific-cognitive practice on complex adaptive
  systems. Our ultimate goal is to work towards a framework for the
  cognitive, so, although our discussion will be more grounded in
  biological phenomena, this will be so within the framework of a
 bottom-up
  continuity thesis by which we understand that cognition, as a late
  phenomena in the evolutionary history of organisms, must be
 understood
  and grounded in biological organization and history, in its
 biological
  conditions of posibility, biological trascendentals (\emph{à la}
  `naturalized' Kant). We tend to categorize complex realities in
  hierarchical levels (cells, organisms, communities, societies,
 etc.), and
  the idea that higher levels of complexity (and adaptation) can be
  explained form lower level 'dynamics' and components articulates an
  ambitious scientific program.
  But the theoretical and pragmatic demands of our scientific
 practice
  requires more than a program, more than an intuitive idea. Methods,
 frameworks
  in which experiments and theory are to be articulated and
 connections
  between different levels of analysis are required.

  In this essay we explore the concept of function, specially its
  evolutionary version (whose significance is central in contemporary
  biology ---and philosophy of the mind) and try to link it with the
  concept of autonomy, exploring how a normative notion of function
  can be sustained by present causal mechanisms.
  We try to explore how a next step in the hierarchy of
  complex systems could be achieved by redefining this terms in the
 cognitive
  domain.


\section{Function}
 \subsection{The function of functionalism}
  Functionalism stands for one of the most relevant theoretical
 frameworks
  in the history of biological and cognitive sciences. The relevance
 of
  the functionalist framework can be understood from a double
 requirement
  it fulfills when facing the understanding of adaptive systems:
  \begin{enumerate}
    \item \emph{ As the grounds for semantic, intentional (mental)
 and
      teleological explanations} whose presence in human
 understanding
      (be it philosophical, historical, or folk psychological) and
 self
      (conscious) comprehension and control, is essential. Some
 phenomena
      are seen as empirically untestable because they require a
 backwards
      causation (future outcome explains present trait or behaviour
      \footnote{the bird is digging (now) \emph{ because } it wants
 to
      hide a swarm with the \emph{ purpose } of recovering it when
      inmediate food resources are unavailable (\emph{future})}):
 teleological
      and intentional phenomena belong to this class and a functional
      framework is required to ground the scientific explanations of
 such
      phenomena.
    \item \emph{ As a higher order of description from purely
 physicalist
      or behavioral explanations} . When facing certain phenomenal
      spaces (specially those over the fields of physics and
 chemistry in a
      hierarchy of sciences)
      in which mechanistic explanations (in terms of the physical
      components and mechanisms involved in the phenomenon) do not
      reduce the complexity of the phenomena under study to
 epistemologically
      and pragmatically efficient grounds, functionalist explanations
 are
      seen as a necessary conceptual tool.
  \end{enumerate}

  The functionalist framework, by decomposing adaptive systems into
 functional
  components, stating its causal and formal relations, and/or by
 specifying
  its selective advantages, can be said to be the common (or at least
  classical) ground to analyze and understand biological and
 cognitive
  systems. But what do we mean by functionalism? How is the concept
 of
  function articulated with this purpose?

\subsection{Kinds of functionalism}
  Ned Block \cite{Block 1980} identifies three senses of
 functionalism:
  decompositional, computational and metaphysical.
  \begin{itemize}
    \item \textit{Decompositional} functionalism relies on the
 methodological
      strategy of decomposing a system into components and analysing
 its
      functional role.
    \item \textit{Computational} functionalism (Putnam and Fodor),
 relying on
      the computer metaphor, proposes that functional states are
 equivalent
      to those achievable by digital computers or Turing machines.
    \item \textit{Metaphysical} functionalism claims that mental
 states \emph{are}
      functional states, independently of its physical realization.
      The main claim of functionalism is the claim that the essence
 of a function
      (and a functionally decomposable system) is not its physical
 realization
      but the causal structures (relations) involved among
 components.
  \end{itemize}

  Computational functionalism provides the epistemological grounding
 of
  a formalizable theory of the mind in terms of logical relations
 between
  states, inputs and outputs of a system. Since different physical
 devices
  can (in principle) instantiate the same formal (computational)
 relations,
  functionalism is often related to the so called
  \textit{multiple realizability} hypothesis.

  The behaviour of an ant can be taken as an example of functional
  explanation: if COLLECTING-FOOD, AVOID[low-quantity-sources],
  GO[to-big-energy-sources]. This is a functional (computational)
 explanation:
  the ant is in state COLLECTING-FOOD, and has to execute to outputs:
  AVOID and GO. But that is `just' a functional interpretation both
  `AVOID[low-quantity-sources]' and
  `GO[to-big-enery-sources]' are human categories never present
  as such in any mechanism giving rise ant behaviour.
  What we interpret as GO[to-big-energy-sources] is a complex
  process that emerges
  from local interactions with other ants through trofolaxis
  (chemical `communication') and path following behaviour
  \footnote{Ants tend to
    follow the smell of other ants, if food is found in a place ants
 will
    return with the food to the colony, the paht will be travelled
 twice,
    the smell of the path increases, the probability of the path to
 be taken
    by other ants increases, when taken by other ants keeps
 increasing
    and a collective behaviour emerges: all the ants are following a
 path
    towards a succesfull energy source.}
  as well as from internal neural dynamics. This \emph{independency}
 between
  the physical and the functional, although considered as the biggest
  strength of functional explanations (specially regarding the
 ontological
  \emph{status} of mental events) introduces several dificulties when
  trying to cope with the complexity of the underlying physical
 mechanisms
  from wich functions are predicated. But before going into the
 analysis
  of such problems we shall point to an alternative conceptualization
 of
  function that trys to solve the following question (among others):
  How can we assure the interpretative adequacy (if our
 interpretation
  is correct or just a methaporical description far from what `really
  is goin on' in the system under study) of a functional
    explanation\footnote{ This is doubtless one of the major problems
 of
    functionalism.
  In \cite{Dennet 1990b} Dennet emphasises that any trait or
 mechanism is
  `in principle' subjected to an arbitrary functional
 interpretation.}?

\subsection{In Presence of Proper Functions}
  On the other side of the functional stand a more evolutionarily
  oriented concept of functionality has been developed by several
  authors (Wright, Millikan, Sober, Maynard Smith,...) We will focus
  on Millikan's account of `proper' function, exposed in
  \cite{Millikan 1989}, as one of the most
  representative conceptualization of this notion of evolutionary
 function.

  Evolutionary or Selected functions are defined in terms of history
 rather
  than ``the item's present properties or dispositions'' (p.288). The
 formal
  definition goes as follows (a simplified version of Millikan's
 definition is
  given here):
  \begin{quote}
    The item A has the proper function F iff:
    \begin{enumerate}
      \item \emph{A} originated as the reproduction of \emph{A'} and
 \emph{A}
        causally-historically exists because A' performed function F
 in the
        past; or
      \item \emph{A} originated as a product of some prior device
 \emph{A'}
      that: a) had F as a proper function and b) that causes F to be
      performed by \textit{means} of producing an item like \emph{A}.
      (this will be a \emph{derived} proper function).
    \end{enumerate}
  \end{quote}
  \textbf{In short}: F is a proper function of A if the performance
 of F helped
  the proliferation of the ancestors of A. An example can be
 illustrative
  at this point: the function (F) of the shell (A) of a turtle is to
  protect the turtle because the shell has been reproduced over the
  generations precisely because of its protective function.

  % Millikan's intention is not that of a conceptual analysis
 %(necessary and
  % sufficient conditions for the definition of a term \footnote{a
 %quest that
  % she considers ``a confused program, a philosophical chimera, a
 %squaring
  % of a circle, the misconceived child of a mistaken view of the
 %nature of
  % language and thought.'' p.290}).

  Millikan pretends to give
  a theoretical definition of function in the sense of proper purpose
 and
  not a universal definition of anything that can be said to perform
 a
  function (the rock functions as a paperweight). Nontheless she
 claims that,
  as a matter of fact, having (or performing) a function corresponds,
 in
  the mayority of cases, with having a proper function. For Millikan
 the
  approaches that try ground the concept of function in terms of
 structure
  or disposition fail to account for failure in purpose (nothing in
 the
  present structure can account for normative, the disposition is as
 it
  is). Historical analysis, on the other hand, does account for those
 cases.

  Evolutionary functionalism provides the temptative conclusion of a
  happy coupling scenario between a functionalist theory of
 representations
  and an adaptationist evolutionary theory: the epistemological
 normativity
  of representations can be grounded in the fact that organisms must
 adapt
  to an objective environment. Thus adaptation and representation get
 married
  in the grounds of evolutionary function. Intentional explanations
 can be
  grounded in selection (the content of a representation is fixed by
  selection) and ants \emph{do} AVOID[low-energy-sources] because it
 is
  evolutinarily advantageous.


\section{Failure of function(alism)?}

\subsection{The origin of a function: in favour of organizational
  and not historical hermeneutics}

  But the 'happy' evolutionary functionalism is not out of
 theoretical
  and pragmatic problems. Millikan recognizes that the historical
  dependency of its definition of proper function runs out the
 possibility
  of (logically possible) accidental doubles to have a function
  \footnote{Imagine that an accidental exact copy of a system with
    a proper function comes to existence (as if a copy of yourself
 was to
    appear suddenly behind you). In such case the exact copy
    will not have any proper function if
    it didn't have the history of the original system (your
 accidental copy's
    heart ``does not, in fact, have circulating blood as a proper
 function
    [sic.]''p.292).}
  But she argues that such `logically possible' cases are fallacious
  constructs that do not, as a matter of fact, happen in reality.
  Millikan follows that other definitions of function according to
 which
  accidental copies do have functions, are just descriptions of
  markers that do help us recognize functions but do not address
  the constitutive nature of function and purposiveness which is
  rightly addressed by her definition of proper function, from
  which the rest of the markers parasite. As a matter of fact,
  Millikan concludes, functions (and any non historical definition
  of them) depend on their being proper functions.

  But the artificiality of accidental exact copies, twinearthian
  logical possibilities, and other analytic angloamerican scholastic
  affections do not run out the whole problematicity space of
  Millikan's definition
  \footnote{It must be said that Millikan specifically
    considers her definition to be related to purposive function and
 not to
    ``function as'' (as the performance of an item within the context
 of
    a system --decompositional functionalism above). To quote an
 example from
    her own: ``a diseased heart may not be capable of pumping, of
    functioning \textit{as} a pump, although it is clearly its
 function,
    its biological purpose, to pump (...)''(p.294). What Millikan
 wants to have is a
    normative notion of function. ``The problem [she tries to
 address, and
    solve] is how did the atypical members of the category that
 cannot
    perform its defining function \emph{ get} into the same function
    category as the things that actually can perform the function?''
 (p. 295).
    But categories and epistemological normativities do not belong to
    entities  but to subject-object cognitive relations (are not
 ontological,
    but epistemological, categories), thus, it is, at least,
 problematic to
    ground the notion of function in such relational space and
 responding
    to epistemological problems that do not happen to be in the
 domain of
    the systems under study (but of its cognitive and normative
    categorization ---in the domain of our understanding of them)}.

  The theoretical reason is that if selection (and consequent higher
  differential reproduction) is considered as a modeling factor of
 complex
  adaptive systems whose mechanisms (although selected by evolution)
  operate by means of their physical instantiations, selection cannot
 be
  considered as ontologically present in the system under study,
 selection
  is not a present cause of any behaviour or dynamic of the system,
 as
  pointed out by Maturana \cite{Maturana 1978}
    \footnote{
    According to Maturana functional explanations bring non present
 features to the explanation:
    the evolutionary history of an organism is not present in the
 mechanisms
    governing its behaviour. Functional explanations are semantic
 projections
    which could be metaphorically useful but ontologically
 misleading.
    }
  .

  Thus proper functions turn to be ontologically separated from the
 system
  in which they are performed. This turns to be
  specially problematic when considering the following sort of
 questions:
  \begin{enumerate}
    \item The question of the origin of a function.
      A function must perform as a
      function to be selected. Millikans account falls into a
      \emph{petitio principii} because the function of a trait
      recursivelly refers to its historical function.
    \item The question of functional innovation (new meanings,
 learning,
      new adaptive strategies, etc.). How do new functions arise
      remains unresolved in her proposal. Although Millikan
      does not pretend to address this issue in her account of
      `proper' functions, it is of primary importance specially if
      we take into account that cognitive and adaptive systems
      often have to find innovative solutions to problems they never
      encoutered before.
    \item The question of function determination when there is no
      access to history. How do we determine the function of a trait,
      or behaviour, when the history of the system it belongs to
      is unaccesible or nonexistent?
  \end{enumerate}

  These questions can be summarized in the following one:
  \begin{itemize}
    \item How can we ground functionality to be ontologically tided
 to
    the system it belongs to and still have a `proper' hermeneutic
 horizon
    in which evaluate different functional accounts?
  \end{itemize}

  Although Millikan's approach can be an interesting way to
 normativize
  the concept of function it leaves (as we have seen)some fundamental
  problems unresolved. In particular those related to organization
 (how
  function relates to its physical realization and other components
 in
  a system), origins
  and the nature itself of the concept of function. Her definition is
  circular in that sense (proper functions require previous
 functionality
  of ancestors, and so on \emph{ad infinitum}).

\subsection{Interaction, emergence and other problems of
 functionalism:}

  The problems pointed out on Millikan's account of functionalism are
 not
  the only problems that a functional explanation must face. As
 Emmeche
  points out \cite{Emmeche 1992} any functional account must face
 three
  major problems:
  \begin{enumerate}
    \item Formalization may not catch all the causally effective
 mechanisms
    \item ``The construction that implements the formal structure is
 still in
      need of our interpretation in order to give any meaning.''
 Meaning is a
      projection of an observer if it cannot be linked with
 materiality
      (semantics are not intrinsic to syntax \emph{á la} Searle).
    \item Formally, functionally, equivalent systems can be
 absolutely non
      equivalent in real life where time and energy can be essential.
  \end{enumerate}

    This problems point to the importance of the physical
 (energetical, spatial
    and temporal ---dynamical) embodiment of functions. The
 embodiment and
    environmental embededness of adaptive (biological and cognitive)
 systems
    give rise to specific problems of functionalism that has been
 pointed out
    by Andy Clark \cite{clark96, clark97} under the label of
    \emph{interactive emergence}. Interactive emergence points to two
 major
    difficulties:
    \begin{enumerate}
    \item \emph{Dissolution of functional accounts in highly
 interactive loops.}
      This is the agent-environment side of
      interactive emergence by wich behavioural functions are the
 outcome of
      complex interactive loops between agent and environment where
 the causal
      mechanisms are difficult to specify by classical computational
 functionalism
      since functional units/behaviours cannot be isolated from the
      agent-environment \emph{metasystem}. In this sense Luc Steels
 \cite{Steels 1991}
      defines behaviour as an emerging from the direct interaction
      and control of different components and mechanisms with the
 environment
      and other agents. This way emergent functions cannot be
 understood as
      formal relations between components of an organism or adaptive
      mechanisms to certain environmental conditions. A dynamical
 definition
      of function is proposed instead with more emphasys on indirect
 control
      and the tendency of interactive asymptotic stability (the
 agent-environment
      system tends to a dynamic equilibrium)
    \item \emph{Dissolution of functional units in distributed causal
 networks.}
      Probably one of the major chalenges to functionalism comes from
      the connectionist approach, its main conceptual weapon being
 the focus
      on the importance of a distributed causal mechanisms where no
 specific
      component can be said to perform a specific function. The major
 problem
      of a distributed causal network is not that there are no
 directly specifiable
      physical components that perform independient functions
 (because functionalism
      does not require a physical decompositionality) but the fact
 that this
      distributed nature of the mechanisms constraints and modifies
 the behaviour
      or nature of a trait. Some things cannot be explained by
 (evolutionary) functional
      accounts because they are caused by complex underlying dynamics
 which are
      not subjected to functional analysis. Langton \cite{Langton
 1991} points to the nonlinear
      nature of biological organism: their behaviour is the effect of
 the
      interactions between components (unlike linear systems where
 the global
      behaviour is the summ of the behaviour of the components
 analyzed in
      isolation) and an explanation of the system must study it as a
 hole,
      requiring a synthetic efford, rather than an analytic one.
    \end{enumerate}



\section{Conclusion: Autonomy as an hermeneutic axis for
  functionalism}

  In this section we shall finally consider how the concept of
  autonomy can help solving some of the problems mentioned above
  (specially those concerning the mechanistic nature of a function
  and its normativity) and how autonomous robotics and computer
  simulations become necesary tools for this synthetic and holitic
  efford.

  The concept of autonomy as a central notion for the study of
  biological, cognitive and adaptive systems in general has been
  largelly ignored by clasical funcitonalist. First introduced
  by Maturana and Varela in \cite{mv73} under the concept of
  autopoiesis, \emph{autonomy} becomes the key notion from which
  biological systems are understood from a systemic perspective.

  We shall point out how the concept of autonomy can contribute
  to solve the problems mentioned above by considering some of
  the main characteristics of autonomy.

    The basis of all autonomy is the
    active (internal and external) role of the system to contribute
    to its \emph{self-maintenance}: the production of components and
 the
    active change of boundary conditions of the system to
    maintain the essential variables (energy, temperature, etc.)
    homeostatically. In fact autonomous systems wouldn't exist
    in nature without this central characteristic. Ruiz-Mirazo
    and Moreno \cite{rmm01} have developed the notion of
    \emph{basic autonomy} by specifying the termodynamic and
    energetic requirements of a system to be autonomous in
    this sense. The physical
    realization of a function is analyzed by the authors
    dynamically integrating energetic and termodynamic constraints
    into the explanation. This way the function of a component can
    be explained not as its adaptation to an external feature
    of the environment but as its contribution to the
 self-maintenance
    of the system~\cite{collier99} (structure and function are thus
    integrated in the physical realization of the autonomy of
    a system \footnote{solving some (but not all) of the
    problems of the adaptationist program as critisized by
    Gould and Lewontin \cite{Gould and Lewontin 1979}}).
    The normativity of a function can be,
    thus, refered to its physical realization and not to its
    past history (the heart of your magic twin copy has a
    function becaus it is activelly contributing to the
    maintenance of the system). It should be noted that this
    reference to the self maintenance is compatible with the
    millikanian account but still solves some of its problematic
    holes and it is not constrained to its metabolic side.
    Metabolic reactions
    are sometimes too slow to maintain an internal stability
    under rapidly changing conditions, that is the role of
    the nervous system connecting sensory-motor surfaces
    to deal with environmental changes rapidly and without
    involving change in the purelly metabolic proceses. Thus
    the nervous system, metabolically decoupled but embeeded in
    the organism has to know how to evaluate the results of
    its body control. Affections and internal sensors become
    then major features to autonomously build an cognitive
    internal normativity \cite{Christensen and Hooker in press}.
    A second level of functionality (cognitive functionality) can thus
    be described where nervous mechanisms anticipate the effect
  of environmental interactions for the self-maintenance of
  the system without having to produce the interaction itself
  (and subsequently compensate for the produced desequilibrium of
  essential variables). This way what grounds
  semantics is not an \emph{absolute} epistemological
  stand which requires \emph{absolute} observers but the
  intrinsic evaluative mechanisms of a cognitive agent.



 The concept of function must be grounded in autonomy (from a
 bottom-up \emph{basic autonomy approach}) if we want to develop
 appropriate tools to understand and conceptualize adaptive
 systems without falling into an hermeneutic relativism (everything
 can be interpreted as functional) but avoiding recursion to
 history as a causally effective mechanism. Autonomy becomes, thus,
 the hermeneutic axis of a bottom up explanation of adaptation and
 cognition.
 In this task computer simulations are to be found as
 necesary tools not only in the modeling of concrete phenomena but
 in the development of a proper conceptual frameworks, specially
 by the interactive-emergent nature of biological and congnitive
 functions. The synthetic enterprise but at work by the artificial
 life community is the first steep for a more sincere cognitive
 relation with our complex world.



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  This document was done using \LaTeXe~; running on Debian GNU/Linux. \\
  \begin{center}
   \emph{The use of free software is not `just' a possible technological
    choice but the condition of possibility of a technological
    (cybernetic---control through applied knowledge) autonomy}
  \end{center}

\end{document}
